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Introduction: 
It is widely agreed that fast economic growth from the low-income (LI) level to the middle-
income (MI) one is mainly driven by technological catch-up, cheap labor, export-led growth, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and increases in productivity. However, when it comes to 
jumping from the MI level to the high-income (HI) one, things become far more complex. 
Not surprisingly, there is huge disagreement about how developing countries can rise from 
the MI to the HI range. This phenomenon, namely: the ‘middle-income trap’ (MIT), was a 
term coined by Gill and Kharas to refer to the inherent challenges MI countries face in order 
to reach the HI status (2007). Empirical evidence suggests there are shared difficulties 
present at this level of income worth studied in depth, as out of the 101 MI economies in 
1960, only 13 (without counting oil exporting countries) had obtained the HI status by 2008 
(World Bank, 2013). A well-known example can be found in Latin America and the Middle 
East, where several countries reached the MI range during the 1960s and the 1970s  but then 
got stuck at this level for the next decades. Only one country from these two regions 
reached the HI level by 2013 and remained ever since: Chile. 
Towards the MIT two major groups of scholars have positioned themselves; those 
who argue it is a real phenomenon and those who do not. Among the scholars who 
acknowledge the existence of a ‘trap’, Kanchoochat (2015) distinguishes three bodies of 
literature. Each of them discern different causes and suggest different policies to overcome 
it. The first group emphasize the importance of institutions and education in producing 
economic growth. A second group point to promote industrial upgrading in a first place in 
order to escape the trap, while, the third group, also focused on industrial policy, stress how 
crucial it is to change the export composition by first exploiting the economy’s comparative 
advantage. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Income classification GNI per capita (Atlas method) (World Bank, 2013) 
Threshold GNI/Capita (Current US$) 
Low-income $1,035 or less 
Lower-middle income $1,036 to $4,085 
Upper-middle income $4,086 to $12,615 
High-income $12,616 or more 
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During the last quarter of the 20th century, the Four Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Singapore) adopted an industrial policy strategy that resulted in an 
unprecedented success. On the contrary, Latin American economies had no clear 
development strategy defined and continue since the 1970s to be stuck at the MI level. 
Evidently, experiences differ across time and space, what makes each economy worth 
studying in its particular context. This paper selects Chile: the first Latin American country to 
overcome the trap. According to the World Bank measures (see Figure 1), Chile quickly 
jumped from the MI to the Upper-Middle Income (UMI) level and finally obtained the HI 
status in 2013, hence the study is mostly focused on the two decades before 2013 (World 
Bank, 2013). Unlike many countries in Latin America, Chile is a unique example where 
neoliberalism worked out (Davis-Hamel, 2012), what makes interesting to assess how and 
why it worked out. 
The research examines the trajectory followed by the Chilean economy during its 
time as a UMI country in order to evaluate in which of three categories respecting the three 
bodies of research indicated by Kanchoochat (2015) the Chilean experience fits best.  
First, it is fundamental to evaluate the arguments for and against the existence of a 
trap. In a second place, the literature review examines the three bodies of MIT literature 
distinguished by Kanchoochat. The Chilean experience is then examined in reference to 
these in order to, ultimately, determine which of the three categories the Chilean success 
can be attributed to. The study answers the following research question: ‘How did Chile 
overcome the middle-income trap?’ 
Relevance of the study: 
The MIT is present in many comparative studies and policy models, and although it is  still a 
quite an ambiguous and undefined concept, its potential usefulness to guide policy-making is 
unmistakable. The idea of a trap can be understood as universally applicable since it 
represents a common struggle for countries in development. Despite the little amount of 
research exclusively focused on the MIT, this one can be studied from a range of 
perspectives from the field of economics and political economy. Moreover, Chile’s phase as 
an UMI economy is an unprecedented case, similar to the Asian Tigers, Chile’s economic 
growth was fueled thanks to an export-led growth strategy, but unlike them, this one was 
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heavily influenced by the neoclassical and not the statist model of political economy. Given 
these unique circumstances, the Chilean case is worth studying in respect to the MIT to 
determine which of the policies belonging to the three bodies of research had the biggest 
impact in creating growth at this income level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  S2470187 
 
6 
 
Chapter 1. Assessing the Existence of the MIT and Its Main Approaches 
The literature review is divided in two parts. First, it evaluates the arguments for and against 
the existence of the MIT as it is a new and still vague concept whose existence has not yet 
been widely acknowledged. As follows, the second part of the review introduces the 
theoretical framework to examine the peculiar Chilean case. It introduces the three bodies 
of MIT literature distinguished by Kanchoochat (2015), with the aim of reviewing their 
strengths and limitations in order to later assess in which of the three Chile’s story fits best.  
1.1. MIT: A Real Phenomenon? 
1.1.1. MIT Skeptics: 
Felipe, Kumar and Galope argue the idea of the MI trap is too vague and undefined. They 
claim scholars have widely failed to establish an explicit definition and a clear theoretical 
explanation (2017, p. 431). Their study contains a large sample of economies over several 
decades to determine the number of years past MI countries were trapped on average in 
comparison with MI countries at the present. The data reveals that past MI economies took 
on average much more time to graduate than countries stuck nowadays , so the authors 
conclude that what differentiates the ‘escapees’ from the ‘non-escapees’ is merely the 
capacity to avoid a severe growth slowdown and not some common structural difficulties 
inherent at this income range. 
Felipe et al. underplay the importance of the East Asian miracle in the MIT literature, 
arguing that their rapid graduation was a rare phenomenon that should not be taken as a 
point of reference (2017, p. 446). By only taking average time the authors ignore two key 
things. First, when denying the existence of the MIT, it is irrelevant to find that past MI 
countries took on average more time to graduate than what countries stuck nowadays are 
so far taking, as these countries have not yet escaped. Second, average times completely 
disregard the in-country experiences. Notwithstanding that their calculations include a large 
amount of data from 124 countries from 1950 to 2008, this totally ignores the fact that the 
experiences of countries that graduated more than half a century ago (e.g. United Kingdom, 
France or Italy) are quite distinct from today’s MI countries  and therefore incomparable in 
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many respects. Their analysis is problematic as it ultimately homogenizes experiences across 
time and space.  
Pritchett and Summer (2014) also claim the idea of a trap is obscure and deny its 
existence. According to the authors, this imaginary ‘trap’ is merely the deceleration of a 
prolonged period of economic growth. Their empirical study reveals that high rates of 
economic growth in the past were frequently followed by abrupt slowdowns. They compare 
the MIT with the statistical phenomenon ‘regression to the mean’ and discuss there is 
nothing special about this particular range of income, because although significant 
slowdowns are frequently present at this level, at others, these are also likely to occur (2014, 
p. 4). For instance, they question the conventional belief that the Asian giants, China and 
India, will continue to grow at a great pace since high rates of economic growth are 
unsustainable in the long-run while slowdowns, on the other hand, as time passes, become 
much more likely. Their approach is rather impractical and contradictory for disregarding the 
actual factors that might contribute to the slowdown (which they actually agree is frequent 
in this particular range of income), one that is characterized to be preceded by a long period 
of high economic growth.  
Bulman, Eden and Nguyen (2017) differentiate the MIT in relative (compared to HI 
countries) and real terms. They agree that escaping the MIT in terms of relative income with 
for instance, the United States, is very difficult, yet in real terms, they deny the existence of 
such a trap based on the idea that graduates, like the Four Asian Tigers, succeed to grow 
faster throughout other incomes (i.e. from LI to lower MI), while non-escapees experienced 
lower growth rate at these levels. Therefore, they shift the focus to country-specific 
challenges instead of universal ones. Similarly, Im and Rosenblatt examine whether the 
transition from MI to HI is different from others and find that there is in fact, little difference 
across transitions in other income ranges (2015, pp. 3-4). However, they do acknowledge the 
usefulness of the MIT for guiding policy recommendations because unlike Bulman et al. 
argue, it distinguishes the shared challenges MI economies face at this level. Ultimately, they 
acknowledge its utility to draw lessons from “escapees” to better discern potential policies 
to promote sustainable economic growth (p. 25). 
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In conclusion, arguments against the existence of the MIT suffer from certain flaws, 
both in methodological and practical respects. Felipe et al. (2017) compare the experiences 
of ‘escapees’ during the 1960s with today’s MI countries, what is problematic, as it 
disregards how different MI economies were half a century ago. For example, current MI 
economies suffer from ‘premature de-industrialization’, their manufacturing sector is much 
smaller than past MI economies, so their challenges are remarkably distinct (Doner & 
Schneider, 2016, p. 624). Bulman et al., (2017) overlook the universal difficulties, while 
Pritchett and Summer (2014), and Im and Rosenblatt (2013), make the opposite mistake: 
hence homogenizing the experiences across time and space by pointing that slowdowns are 
equally likely to occur at other levels. Despite this, Im and Rosenblatt agree it is a helpful 
concept to guide policy-making.  
1.1.2. MIT Believers: 
Aiyar, Duval, Puy, Wu & Zhang compare the frequency of slowdowns at the three different 
income thresholds and conclude there is a ‘trap’ since decelerations have occurred more 
frequently at the MI level (2013, p. 12).  
 
Figure 2: Frequency of slowdowns (Aiyar et al., 2013, p. 12) 
Ohno (2009) takes a more qualitative approach making sense of the trap as a “glass ceiling” 
between the four stages of industrialization catch-up (based on the Asian experience). For 
countries to escape the MIT, they must overcome stage two of development: when firms do 
not need to rely anymore on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for technology transfers and 
support, and instead, in the third stage, local firms have the capacity to produce high-quality 
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goods as they have already mastered the technology and management required (Ohno, 
2009, pp. 7-8).  
 
Figure 3: MIT as a technological ceiling (Ohno, 2009, p. 6) 
The work by scholars who conceive the MIT as a real phenomenon is more compelling, 
however their approaches are vastly diverse. This, makes it challenging to agree on a 
singular theoretical framework because the cases studied, the causes of the trap, the 
research methods and the policies recommended, vary substantially (Kanchoochat, 2015, pp. 
55-56). The study of the MIT is multidimensional, it can revolve around many political and 
economic issues at once. The next section of the review presents a simplification of the 
literature based on the three main bodies of research distinguished by Kanchoochat (2015).  
1.2. Three Theoretical Approaches to the MIT  
When studying the effects of the MIT, research done differ on several components such as: 
the methodological tools employed, levels analyzed, theoretical assumptions made, as well 
as the fundamental causes and policies recommended. This section introduces 
Kanchoochat’s categorization of the three main bodies of MIT research (2015, p. 56). The 
first group is composed of neoclassical scholars who call for a stronger focus on improving 
education and institutions (Aiyar et al., 2013; Jimenez, Nguyen & Patrinos, 2012). The second 
group argues industrial policy is the solution: the state should to defy the economy’s 
comparative advantage and direct resources to encourage industrial development (Paus, 
2012). Finally the third group, also highlights industrial policy and the need to change export 
composition, but, by following the economy’s  comparative advantage (Lin & Treichel, 2012).  
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1.2.1. A) Getting Education and Institutions Right 
One of the key strengths of developed countries  over those trying to catch up is the 
presence of efficient and supportive institutions backed with highly-skilled professionals to 
steer and monitor them and an educated workforce that increases productivity. This body of 
research points to the necessity of building an effective institutional infrastructure and 
education system as two preconditions to guarantee sustainable economic growth.  
In an study with a set of regressors containing as many as 42 explanatory variables, 
Aiyar et al. stress the importance of having the right institutions as the opposite could not 
only fail to produce economic growth, but also undermine it since poor institutions have a 
negative impact on efficiency, innovation and resource allocation (2013, p. 13). For the 
authors, institutions must be robust and business-friendly, so they can effectively promote 
property rights and contract enforcement in order to protect outside investors. The study 
arrives to the conclusion that, big government and regulation can often be strong 
impediments of growth in MI countries (p. 30). As it is noticeable, their policy prescriptions 
are based on the liberal conception that free markets are the main contributor to national 
economic growth. Furthermore, their mathematical model has certain limitations, as it 
combines a small number of observations with a large number of variables what “seriously 
limits the credibility and generalization of the results” (Han & Wei, 2017, p. 44).  
Along the same lines, Kharas and Kohli (2011) and Jimenez et al. (2012, p. 2) 
understand the trap as the incapacity of MI countries to compete, on one side with LI 
countries in producing low-cost products, and on the other, with advanced economies in 
producing high-value products. To tackle this lack of competiveness, the authors emphasize 
the importance of boosting productivity through education. In particular, education that 
grants people the necessary skills to make them more productive in these areas of the 
economy that are more likely to have the greatest impact on growth. For this understanding 
the coordination between government, universities and industry is extremely influential  
(Kanchoochat, 2015, 58).  
Paus (2014) argues against this neoclassical economic growth model for narrowly 
understanding the MIT as a mere slowdown as it downplays the importance of time and 
location and only encouraging vague universal policies to somehow improve the institutional 
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and education systems (p. 13-14). She argues historical evidence contradicts the neoliberal 
body, as two thirds of the total slowdowns in MI countries occurred after the 1980; when 
developing economies pursued market-led policies recommended by the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus (Paus, 2017, p. 3).  
In regard to criticism towards education, it is acknowledged that advancements in the 
system do not necessarily enhance productivity per se, since only improvements in 
education in certain sectors and at a particular level might actually have an impact on 
economic growth (Jimenez et al, 2012 p. 4). The casual link between education and higher 
economic growth is indirect, thus it is very difficult to assess its positive effects (Kanchoochat, 
2015, p. 58).  
In sum, this body of literature argues the government is supposed to have a 
minimum role in economic affairs; the best it can do is to improve institutions by making 
them more efficient and market-friendly while advancing productivity through education. In 
spite of the vagueness and the empirical contradictions, this category is highly relevant for 
the case of Chile. In contrast, the next two bodies call for an active government to structure 
the economy’s industries and export basket.  
1.2.2. B) Industrial Upgrading by Defying Comparative Advantage 
Because in theory MI states cannot compete with LI countries in the production of cheap 
commodities, neither in high value-added activities as they lack the productivity of HI 
countries, Paus analyzes the available routes to enhance productivity and sustained growth 
for developing countries (2012, p. 116). In a debate with Lin, Chang (2009) points to the 
necessity that the state encourages structural transformations meant to promote 
technological development and produce sustainable long-term growth. Such approach 
demands the government to take an active role in “creating new comparative advantages in 
technologically more advanced activities” (p. 129). The argument of this second group of 
writers is based on economic as well as political factors. It characterizes the trap as “the lack 
of structural change towards higher value-added activities in the context of international 
competitiveness” (Paus, 2014, p. 13). Thus, the primary cause and solution for the trap is 
attributed to the lack of an active government as the architect of industrial policies targeted 
to promote structural change and technological advancements . 
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Along these lines, Doner and Schneider (2016) question why is it that although there 
is substantial literature about the causes of the trap and the policy remedies to escape it, 
countries still have so many difficulties to put the theory into practice. Indeed, it is mainly in 
the hands of the economic and political elites to invest the national resources (frequently 
scarce) in long-term projects like education and research and development (R&D) (pp. 610-
611). These governmental institutions are needed to prudently coordinate the interests of 
multiples actors when implementing the policies aimed to upgrade the country’s industries 
(p. 612).   
Like the previous, this approach also suffers from certain flaws. Ohno argues that the 
idea of a country in development redirecting its scarce resources to develop sophisticated 
technologies is both, a ‘myth’ and unfeasible. A country should instead, import complex 
technologies from abroad and exploit them following the country’s comparative advantage –
and not waste resources attempting to create them from scratch (2009, p. 9). In principle, 
for Ohno (2009) and Lin and Treichel (2012), it is counterproductive and extremely difficult 
to attempt to grow industries where a country has no comparative advantage.  
1.2.3. C) Changing Export Composition by Following Comparative Advantage 
For the third body of scholars the export composition of the economy is also critical to 
produce growth. This category puts the blame on the absence of the necessary means to 
produce and export high value-added goods. The MIT is understood as the lack of “labor 
productivity growth through technological innovation and industrial upgrading.” (Lin, 2017, p. 
6).   
To escape the trap, Lin and Treichel (2012) argue a country should focus on its 
comparative advantages at each stage of development. This strategy would allow firms to be 
more competitive domestically and abroad, what would generate large surpluses that could 
then be re-invested in better physical and human capital, or even, redirected to new 
industries where the country could potentially develop new comparative advantages  and 
thereby, creating a vicious circle that upgrades the country’s export basket over time. 
Ultimately, allowing the country to gradually climb the ladder and catch-up with HI countries 
more rapidly (p. 7). Hence, to assess if the Chilean experience fits into this category it is 
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required to track the evolution of its export basket, find comparative advantages and 
determine whether there were spillovers to develop new industries.  
The criticism of the second and third bodies of literature is mutual. Chang agrees that 
developing countries need to climb the technological stairs of the ladder in order to develop, 
yet he deeply opposes to the idea that merely focusing on exploiting the comparative 
advantages is the fastest way. First, workers cannot easily be redirected to the more 
competitive industries of a country. Second, a country exploiting its comparative advantage 
will not accumulate enough capital to enter new industries enough rapidly, since surpluses 
are not likely to be saved to be reinvested in other industries, rather spent in more 
instruments to continue exploiting the current industries (Lin & Chang, 2009). 
1.3. Theoretical Conclusions 
In can be concluded that none of the three groups distinguished by Kanchoochat (2015) 
propose an ideal model to approach the MIT. The three bodies of literature have both, 
strengths and limitations to explain its causes and to propose adequate policies to overcome 
it. The next section introduces the case of Chile and lays the foundations of the research 
design. Subsequently, chapter 3 applies the three models to the Chilean experience, with the 
aim of determining which one fits the best to this case. 
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Chapter 2. Chile Facing the MIT 
As a country that has recently escaped the trap (in 2013 according to World Bank standards), 
Chile presents itself as unique case study. A story quite different from the East Asian miracle, 
yet neither similar to Latin America. 
2.1. Profile 
Unlike the rest of Latin America, Chile is believed to be an example where neoliberalism 
worked out (Davis-Hamel, 2012). The country’s GDP growth averaged an outstanding 5.05% 
in the two decades before becoming a HI country (from 1994 to 2013) (OECD, 2019a). This 
success is widely attributed to its export-oriented economy focused on natural-resources. 
Furthermore, Chile is one of the most financially integrated economies. In the last decades 
the country has been at the vanguard of financial and capital account liberalization and as 
result, its total sum of foreign assets and liabilities relative to GDP was considerably above 
the emerging economies average (Podpiera, Sosa and Wu, 2012, p. 4). The government has 
been very committed greater trade openness and has gradually reduced tariffs close to only 
2%, encouraged FDI absorption, and guaranteed economic stability to foreign investors. In a 
nutshell, the Chilean economy is deeply liberalized and business-friendly. The next section 
studies in greater detail the historical context of Chile’s economic model.  
2.2. The Chilean Liberal Transformation  
The major transformations in the Chilean economy relevant to this study date back to the 
late 70s. Accordingly this section revises some of the key economic policies since the 1973 
coup d'état to the mid-2010s (when Chile obtained the HI status). The usefulness of a 
comprehensive historical analysis is clear as it places  into context the policies that might 
have contributed (or discouraged) the country to reach the HI range.   
In just a couple of years, Chile went from having a leftist government to become 
subjected to the rule of a fascist dictatorship. If the first entity shaped the economy 
according to the socialist model, the second, was one of the pioneer states experimenting 
with the brand-new neoliberal economic model.  
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With Augusto Pinochet in command, the military took control over the country in 
1973 and soon reversed many of the leftist reforms. The restructure of the economy began 
when the Chilean dictator became persuaded by a group of Chilean neoliberal thinkers 
known as the “Chicago Boys”. Most among this group of scholars were educated at the 
University of Chicago under the influence of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger (Rector, 
2019).  
Despite being a time of high economic uncertainty, during the 1970s, Pinochet’s 
government embraced the yet untested neoliberal understanding of a free market economy. 
The early policies included: abrupt privatization, deregulation, liberalization of the financial 
system, capital account liberalization (in 1980) and large cuts in public spending ; moreover, 
in 1979 the Chilean peso was pegged to the US dollar at a fixed exchange rate. Friedman’s 
shock-therapy carefully targeted these areas with the potential to create a business-friendly 
atmosphere that could rapidly promote growth and encourage trade and foreign investment 
(Ahumada, 2019, p. 84; Rector, 2019, p. 201).  
For five years (1976-1980) the economy boomed, but the new aggressive but still 
unsustainable reforms proved to be unsuccessful in the long run (Spillan, Virzi, & Morales, 
2017, p. 75). For example, in the area of trade, domestic businesses were dangerously 
exposed as a result of the tariff reduction from an average of 100% to less than 10% in just a 
few years (Rector, 2019, p. 202). There was an unequal access to the market; conglomerates 
were soon consolidated for having supported the neoliberal turn, while big businesses 
enjoyed, among other things, exclusive access to foreign capital (Ahumada, 2019, p. 85).  
Unfortunately, the economy was too vulnerable to the constraining forces coming 
from the global economy and the government struggled to adjust monetary policy to 
external shocks. These shocks pushed the government to peg the Chilean peso off the fixed 
exchange rate (Roberts & Araujo, 1997, p. 35). In addition, debt spiked to almost 120% of 
the GDP (CEICDATA, 2018). The measures adopted to this failure, actually suggested that, 
(according to neoliberal standards) part of the problem was that the economy was still too 
dominated by the state.  
In 1985, Hernán Büchi was appointed to save the economy. The new minister of 
finance went one step further applying aggressive supply-side economic reforms in order to 
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promote FDI, privatize more companies and create a new philosophy and mentality that paid 
greater value to the entrepreneurial role and business interests of private firms. Finally, the 
reforms had a positive impact producing high rates of sustainable export-led growth as well 
as investment for the upcoming decade (Spillan et al., 2017, p. 76). In addition, with Büchi 
Chile’s debt was reduced by half, yet at the cost of austere measures in public spending 
(CEICDATA, 2018).  
In 1988, Pinochet resigned when a public referendum voted against him to remain in 
power. Supported by big business owners, Büchi decided to run for president. However, the 
public perceived him as too closely related to Pinochet and thus many feared the 
continuation of the regime. In the end Patricio Aylwin, a moderate center-left candidate 
from the Christian Democratic Party, won the presidency (Kyle, 2000, pp. 100-101). His 
victory marked the beginning of the concertación era which refers to the continuing rule of 
the Coalition of Parties for Democracy from 1990 to 2010, composed by: the Christian 
Democratic Party, the Socialist Party of Chile and the Party for Democracy (Fernandez & Vera, 
2012, pp. 10-11).  
With Aylwin, Chile experienced its highest rates of annual economic growth (average 
of 7.8%), unfortunately this success came along with very high rates of inflation (average of 
17.7% per annum) (Solimano, 2013, p. 340). The president had stressed several times during 
his campaign that despite the economic miracle, about 40% of Chileans continued to live 
below the poverty line. Maintaining high rates of economic growth while assisting those 
segments of the population less benefitted became one of the main challenges for the 
subsequent governments. In spite of the rising inequality, the neoliberal model of export-led 
growth and privatization continued to be at the core of the government’s agenda (Rector, 
2019, p. 239).  
The outlook was more positive during the Frei Ruiz-Tagle administration. Tariffs were 
reduced even further and inflation finally tamed. The economy boomed during Frei’s first 
two years, however, the 1998 the Asian economic crisis and the collapse of the Argentinian 
economy hit Chile very badly due to its huge dependence on Asian demand (one third of the 
total and its high interconnectedness to neighboring Argentina. Nevertheless, Chile 
continued to grow and to be regarded as the healthiest in the region (Rector, 2019, p. 240).  
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To stimulate trade in accordance with the logic of neoliberalism, the next president, 
Ricardo Lagos, signed free trade agreements with Mexico, Canada, the European Union and 
the United States. When in 2002, the neighboring economy of Argentina collapsed, the 
government could successfully cushion both internal and external shocks with monetary 
policy adjustments. Instead of stimulating the economy through deficit spending, Lagos 
agreed to cut interest rates (Rector, 2019, p. 240). 
Unfortunately, this successful neoliberal model came along with a high price for 
everyday Chileans. Income distribution was among the most unequal in Latin America and 
the highly inefficient and privately controlled health and education systems generated 
massive debts among the less fortunate (Fernandez & Vera, 2012, pp. 10-11). In 2006, 
Michelle Bachelet, a center-left socialist and feminist politician inherited this unequal 
economy and gave hope for change. Yet, by the end of her presidency in 2010, the situation 
was not very different from the beginning (p. 13).  
The neoliberal economic model in place constrained the actions of her government. 
Instead of spending large amounts of Chile’s account surpluses, Bachelet created the 
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF) with the logic of saving the profits generated 
by copper exports when prices were high and the economy was stable, and to only make use 
of this fund when urgently needed (Solimano & Guajardo, 2018, p. 201). This prudent policy 
became an essential tool to protect an economy with an export-led model as such from 
external shocks. For example, in order to finance the 2009 fiscal expansion almost US$9 
Billion were spent from the ESSF throughout that year. Sovereign funds were used again the 
next year to help reconstruct the country from the catastrophic earthquake (p. 212). The 
ESSF served as Chile’s cushion against the risks of its export-led growth strategy promoting 
macroeconomic stability.  
In 2010 copper prices spiked and proceed to gradually decline. This year, multi-
billionaire businessman Sebastián Piñera became president – a liberal conservative from the 
center-right party National Renewal. During his tenure, Chile’s growth became less 
conditioned by exports and more by domestic consumption – the health and educational 
sectors became highly profitable for private businesses (Benedikter & Siepmann, 2015, p. 21). 
During these four years GDP growth averaged 5.33% (World Bank, 2018a).  
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Chile’s governments have been particularly concerned about the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of the economic (monetary stability, fiscal discipline, business openness, 
investment), yet it has largely neglected social welfare policies. Adjusting monetary policy 
became the government’s main tool to hedge against external shocks, and hindsight, it 
seems that Chilean economists prioritized macroeconomic long-term prosperity over short-
term fixes (Rector, 2019, p. 240). 
2.3. Methodological Remarks 
This top-down empirical study aims to build a comprehensive explanation about the casual 
mechanisms that produced the outcome of Chile overcoming the trap by testing the three 
theoretical bodies of MIT research distinguished by Kanchoochat (2015). A process-tracing 
method is employed as it serves as a tool “to study causal mechanisms in a single case 
research design” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 2).  
To construct an explanatory narrative the research concretely approaches the 
question with the method ‘explaining-outcome process tracing’. Such a method can be 
suitably employed to give an account of historical events as it allows the researcher to test 
theories in order “to see whether they can provide a minimally suffic ient explanation of the 
outcome”(Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 63). Minimally sufficient is interpreted as an 
explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts (p. 18). In this case, the 
outcome is Chile overcoming the trap and the theories to test are the three categories 
distinguished by Kanchoochat (2015). 
Since it is unfeasible to track and measure what exactly contributed to economic 
growth and what hindered it, as a way to face this epistemic burden, the three categories 
are used as a reference to simplify and classify the most influential factors in Chile’s path to 
the HI level. To test the three categories, the research has compiled historical data from 
statistics, trade and macroeconomic indicators. The synthesized evidence is categorized 
according to the three bodies of research in chapter 3.   
2.3.1. Limitations 
There are other inescapable limitations in the design. Firstly, with this particular method of 
analysis one cannot be fully sure whether the conclusion arrived is the best explanation 
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among the available – it has to be an explanation that covers the most relevant aspects of 
the outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 20-21). For that reason the analysis must be 
highly descriptive, supported by a rich collection and interpretation of relevant empirical 
data. Secondly, however, the presence of silent evidence, that is, inaccessible yet decisive 
evidence (Taleb, 2007, pp. 100-119), is a major weakness in historical analyses of this type, 
that frequently force the researcher to fall into the narrative fallacy (p. 62-83). Nonetheless, 
the supportive theoretical framework is considered to be of great help as it serves to simplify 
and categorize the plausible explanations and hence can mitigate the inevitable lack of 
empirical material. Thirdly, in spite of this, another unavoidable limitation is that some 
conclusions arrived might not be mutually exclusive in the three categories. Some 
measurements and indicators are present in more than one category and the results might 
reveal certain commonalities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  S2470187 
 
20 
 
Chapter 3. Looking at the MIT Phenomenon in Chile: A Sectorial Approach 
3.1. A) Chilean Institutions and Education: 
This group of research composed by neoclassical scholars propose that the state should be 
limited to build business-friendly and efficient institutions and investing in education 
according growth targets. Because the link between institutions and education and 
economic growth is indirect, it is unfeasible to determine with certainty the extent that 
improvements in these two areas have had in the Chilean economy. Kanchoochat argues 
that education per se and good governance are not enough to produce economic growth. 
Instead, growth-enhancing governance and education with industrial targets are more 
directly linked to economic growth (Kanchoochat, 2015, p. 58). 
Institutions 
Based on the neoclassical understanding of economic growth, this section aims to assess the 
quality of Chilean institutions in terms of how inclusive, business-friendly and growth-
enhancer they have been. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), The wealth of a 
nation is determined by how inclusive its institutions to economic participants are. The role 
of the state is essential to create an environment that incentivizes people to participate and 
innovate in the marketplace, while, providing with hard and soft infrastructure, defending 
property rights and guaranteeing contract enforcement. Therefore, if Chile’s success is 
attributable to this category, it is a necessary condition to observe the presence of efficient 
institutions that promote a business-friendly and inclusive environment.  
There are several indicators that place Chilean institutions among the world’s top 
most inclusive. The worldwide government indicators (WGI, 2013) (a dataset that assess the 
quality of governance and stability regulatory frameworks) ranked Chile throughout the 
years 2002, 2007 and 2012 on a similar basis to HI OECD countries. Concretely in the 
indicators ‘government effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘corruption’ 
Chile stands out for its great performance (Kaufmann, Kraay & Matruzzi, 2019). This success 
could be already reflected in 2008, when the country ranked 33th country in the ease of 
doing business index (World Bank, 2007, p. 6). Accordingly, Chile continues to attract large 
amounts of FDI; as percent of GDP it ranks among the world’s top highest six (OECD, 2018, p. 
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41). For instance, in 2012, Chile’s inward FDI (11.28% of GDP) was three times higher 
compared to neighboring Brazil (3.33%) and four times Argentina (2.64%), and more than 
seven times the OECD average (1.51%) (OECD, 2019b). Forbes magazine ranked Chile the 
24th best country for doing business, the 8th in trade openness and the 27th in property right 
defense (Forbes, 2011).  
These indicators suggest that Chile is indeed a country where the interests of 
investors, local or foreign, are assumed to be well protected and hence comes as no wonder, 
the high amounts of FDI it attracts. Still, FDI inflows is not a conclusive sign of inclusive 
institutions. A country with growth-enhancing institutional frameworks also needs efficient 
economic institutions to guarantee the stability of the system.  
A good example for this is when President Lagos announced a new fiscal policy rule 
to restructure the fiscal balance in 2000; with the aim to “reduce fiscal and macroeconomic 
volatility and to minimize the procyclical behavior of the budget” (Marcel, 2013, pp. 3-17). 
The structural balance rule was more than a complete success; it stabilized GDP growth and 
volatility between the years 2000 and 2005 by a third (p. 25). Following the reform, GDP 
growth averaged 4.6% during this period. The IMF praised Chile’s regulatory framework for 
protecting its financial system from the economic turmoil by guaranteeing its stability and 
mitigating its impact through “decisive and unprecedented policy measures” (IMF, 2009, p. 
65).  
The way Chilean institutions tackled the 2008 global financial crisis serves as another 
illustration of their commitment to economic stability, that actually, resulted to be a turning 
point for overcoming the MIT. Certainly, the ESSF (created in 2007) was a cushion against the 
global recession – by December 2008, the fund had already saved US $20.2 billion in 
surpluses. Thanks to it, Bachelet’s government could successfully implement countercyclical 
policy measures involving a fiscal stimulus plan, a pro-credit plan and a pro-employment 
employment accord; the three were meant to support economic activity, guarantee credit to 
businesses and alleviate unemployment, respectively (IMF, 2009, p. 62). In addition, the 
government could comfortably invest in the construction of new public infrastructure 
(Guellec & Wunsch-Vincent, 2009, p. 24). Furthermore, the Chilean banking and financial 
systems have delivered to the challenge, proving to be resilient and far-reaching, even 
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during the crisis. Circa 2010 just 17.6% Chilean firms found finance as a major constraint, 
close to Korean levels (12.1%) (World Bank, 2010).   
Without the sovereign wealth fund, Chile would have had much more trouble to 
undertake such costly yet very convenient countercyclical measures. For the ministry of 
finance, it has become a key macroeconomic tool to protect the export-led and open 
economy against internal and external shocks (IMF, 2009, p. 64). How have Chilean 
institutions been so instrumental in promoting growth is also the result of improvements in 
education.  
Education 
Education in Chile has been and continues to be a hot issue and the origin of several protest 
movements. In 2006, a series of student demonstrations escalated into the largest public 
uproar since the democratic turn of 1990. The Chilean student movement demanded greater 
access to education and condemned the widespread inequality attributing it to neoliberal 
policies (Kubal & Fisher, 2016, p. 408). In 2011, another critical student-led protest broke out, 
also beginning first as an outcry against the Chilean education system and later turning into 
a major political and social unrest (Guzman-Concha, 2012, p. 411). These upheavals were 
owed in part to major discontents among the population with the unequal access to 
education, yet in two decades prior to 2013 there were large reforms in the system, as 
follows it is analyzed whether these have contributed to Chile escaping the trap.  
Kharas and Kohli (2011) and Jimenez et al. (2012, p. 2) stress the importance of MI 
economies boosting productivity through education to tackle the lack of competiveness 
against HI economies in the production of high value-added products. A highly-skilled labor 
force can be crucial in generating growth and ensuring the well-functioning of institutions. 
However, improvements in education might not per se have an impact on productivity, only 
advancements in particular areas at certain levels might have a major economic effect 
(Jimenez et al, 2012 p. 4). Accordingly, the next paragraphs present an analysis of Chile’s 
education system exclusively focused on the tertiary level and on the country’s comparative 
advantages. 
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In regard to Chile, there are two type of tertiary education relevant to this analysis: 
type-A and type-B. Tertiary type-B is usually shorter and more focused on the elementary 
practical and technical skills to quickly enter the labor market. On the other hand, type-A is 
more theory-oriented and primarily offered under five-year or longer university programs. 
While Chile ranks low in rates of tertiary type-A enrollments, it is the second (behind Korea) 
in rates of tertiary type-B enrolments (OECD, 2009, p. 51).  
The tertiary type-B education is taught in CFTs (Technical Education Center) and IPs 
(Professional Institutes). These programs are considered to give great opportunities to the 
poorest segments of the population to rapidly enter the marketplace, and in Chile, these 
have served as a safety net to those who cannot afford university education. On this subject, 
the tertiary education type-A, Chile continues to lag behind the OECD average, but unlike in 
the type-B, it has significantly improved its relative performance in the past two decades. 
When Chile was under the rule of Pinochet’s regime, the educational system was reduced to 
eight universities with two state universities compromising 65% of all students. Since 1981, 
the system went through a radical transformation led by the government. Nowadays there 
are 60 universities in Chile, 31 of them privately owned (Graham, 2017, p. 14).   
The number of Chilean students enrolled in tertiary education more than tripled 
between 1995 and 2013 (from 342,000 to 1,061,000) (UIS, 2019). Only between the years 
2005 and 2013, the total number of students grew a 76%, the biggest increase among all 
OECD countries mostly composed by young adults (between 18-24 years old) belonging to 
the lowest income deciles of the population (OECD, 2016). Furthermore, in the past years 
the system has been particularly inclusive for women and students with indigenous 
backgrounds (OECD, 2017, pp 177-178).  
In 2013 Chile spent 2.3% of its GDP on tertiary education, the third biggest spender 
among the OECD (OECD, 2019c). The country has the highest rates of private spending on 
education compared to public among all OECD countries and UMI countries. In 1995, 75% of 
the total spending was provided by the private sector, and 85% in 2008. Chile, regardless if 
provided by the public or the private sectors, has seen massive increases in education 
spending in the decade before becoming a HI economy.  
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Education in regard to Chile’s most profitable comparative advantage has also 
improved. From a mining industry-oriented perspective, the research output in this field has 
continued to increase. Two Chilean universities are distinguished for their contributions : the 
University of Chile and the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (UC). Both, continue to 
feature among the top 250 in the QS University Rankings (Graham, 2017, p. 16). The 
University of Chile ranks among the globe’s top 10 mineral and mining engineering 
specialized universities (Top Universities, 2019).  
Higher education availability in the fields of science and engineering has increased 
considerably. In 2000, 1,485 first degrees (per million population) were offered, by 2010 the 
number increased to 3,980, out of which 18.2% were in science and engendering. PhDs 
offered (per million population) went from 4 in 1996 up to 25 in 2010, 70% of them in 
science and engineering) (Foxley & Stallings, 2016, p. 7; NSF, 2012). As a result of this 
positive link between education and the mining industry, more than 235,000 persons were 
employed in the mining sector, or 3.08% of the total Chilean workforce (EMIS, 2017, p. 27).  
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that despite these positive improvements, the 
persistent unequal access to higher education continues to be a central problem for Chileans. 
Lack of access to finance education is one of the biggest issues Chilean institutions must 
tackle in order to meet appropriate HI standards. University fees averaged 40% of income 
per capita, financing these can cost as much as 100% of the total household income for the 
lowest centiles of the population what ends up resulting in excessive borrowing very often 
(Foxley, 2012, p. 144). In the repeated protests led by Chilean students, these have intensely, 
and even violently, expressed their discontent with the state of affairs not exclusively in 
what regards to quality of and access to education, also to the health system, income 
inequality and further social issues.  
On one hand, the Chilean education system has experienced a notable 
transformation in the past two decades, especially in what respects to higher education in 
these areas were Chile has a comparative advantage (i.e. mineral and mining engineering), 
that might have had a positive impact on productivity and economic growth. On the other 
hand, this progress has not been enough inclusive, in partly due to the high costs of the 
privately managed education system and the persistent income inequality.  
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3.2. B) Industrial Upgrading in Chile:  
This second body of research attributes the MIT to insufficient or inadequate quality of 
industrial policy. As it is explained in the introduction, the success of previous escapees is 
associated with industrial policies aimed to develop new comparative advantages in higher 
value-added industries. Scholars in this body of literature emphasize that what a country 
actually exports can make a huge difference and accordingly argue that: it is unfeasible for 
MI economies to catch up without an active state in industrial policy or one that is built upon 
primary-based industries. 
In the case of Chile, the government has not just failed to create comparative 
advantages in high value-added sectors; its national industrial strategy did not even pursue 
this objective. The 2006 report of the National Innovation Strategy For Competitiveness 
(Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad or CNIC for short) clearly opposed to 
the idea that Chile had to move beyond and renounce to its dependency on natural resource 
exports. In fact, the contrary was stated: Chile had to maintain its resource export-led 
growth directing investment to advance technologies only in those industries where it 
already has a comparative advantage (Agosin, Larraín & Grau, 2010, p. 14; Teichman, 2013, p. 
69).  
Chile’s industrial policy largely missed to pursue the policies presented under this 
category. Nonetheless, it is important to analyze the motives for this outcome in order to 
better understand how Chile actually overcame the trap. Indeed, the disconfirmatory results 
of this category are also useful to discern in lieu of what the Chilean government overlook 
the policy prescriptions of this body of research.  
Prioritizing the Private Natural Resource-Based Sectors  
On a structural level, the underlying forces of neoliberalism have constrained the actions of 
Chilean policy-makers. Among others, the powerful influence of big business interests has 
prevented the reroute of investment (Teichman, 2013, p. 67). As it is highlighted in the first 
category, every Chilean government since Pinochet has been fully-committed to this liberal 
economic policy model. Rather than an active state in industrial policy aimed at, for instance: 
protect infant-industries, subsidize potential successful companies or invest in R&D, instead, 
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the Chilean government has been more inclined to direct resources to the already developed 
industries in the natural resource-based sectors.  
Still, even though if the government was absent in the process of innovation, Chile’s 
business and competition-friendly environment, macroeconomic stability, trade openness, 
should have promoted an innovative atmosphere (Benavente, de Mello & Mulder, 2005, p. 
11). It is intriguing why then, the manufacturing sector has declined from 19.3% of the total 
value added of the GDP to just 11.1% of the total, while mining increased from 40% of the 
value of the total exports in 2003, to 57% in 2013 (World Bank, 2018b). There are some 
reasons for this lack of innovation.  
First, there has been a shortfall in R&D investment and innovation. Between 2007 
and 2013 Chile’s spending on R&D as share of its GDP averaged 0.35%, almost seven times 
lower than the OECD average (2.29%) (OECD, 2019d), and around three times lower in 
comparison to the UMI economies of Russia, Malaysia and Brazil. Moreover, out of the little 
investment proportioned by the government, most of it has been directed to low-tech 
industries. For instance, during Bachelet’s first tenure, the government promoted the 
funding of clusters were Chile already had a comparative advantage (Dingemans, 2016, p. 
651), namely, innovation and entrepreneurship centers focused in the natural resource-
based industries (Schwellnus, 2010, p. 30). Such industrial planning allowed for vertical but 
prevented horizontal expansion. Furthermore, the shortage of public R&D spending was not 
filled by private entities either – out of the total 0.4% GDP expenditure in R&D in 2015, only 
about a third was contributed by the private sector (the lowest in the OECD) (Ahumada, 
2019, p. 212). 
However, despite accounting for less than 3% of the total population in Latin America, 
Chile attracted 10% of all multinational projects for R&D centers and 9% of their total 
expenditure in the continent, only behind Brazil and Mexico (Foxley & Stalling, 2016, p. 104). 
Certainly FDI can be very positive for an emerging economy when it promotes technology 
and knowledge transfers, yet, the impact of FDI spillovers on the economy depend on the 
nature of the areas which is directed to. In the case of Chile, FDI has been largely missing in 
the more technologically advanced industries. As much as 34% of the total FDI drawn was 
directed to the mining sector, 22% to services and just 11% to manufacturing (Korinek, 2019, 
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p. 14). The industries that have profited the most from FDI have been the ones already 
benefited from business-friendly policies, principally, from the natural resource-based 
sectors as well as a few service sectors. And, apart from having little connections with the 
rest of the economy, these industries lack the potential to produce spillovers into high-tech 
and high value-added areas (Caldentey, 2012, p. 189).  
As a result, innovation output in Chile is very low for HI standards, its high-technology 
share of manufactured exports was just 4.6% of the total; well below UMI economies like 
Malaysia (43.4%) or China (25.8%), and even smaller than the Latin American average (10.9%) 
(Foxley & Stalling, 2016, p. 9; NSF, 2012). Most innovation has occurred in foreign 
enterprises or by foreign actors, for example, patent applications filled per million 
population were 166 circa 2010, and 146 of these were filled by non-residents (WEF, 2010; 
Foxley & Stalling, 2016, p. 9) 
MI countries face the following conundrum: to exploit their comparative advantages 
or to attempt to create new industries. Continuing exploiting the already specialized and 
profitable industries that once lifted the country from poverty is both, a blessing as it might 
continue helping to produce economic growth, and a curse, since it costs the opportunity to 
exploit new industries. This situation is exacerbated when the comparative advantage lies in 
very low-tech industries. In the case of Chile, concentrated in the exploitation of natural 
resources with few potential technological spillovers (Ahumada, 2019, p. 196). 
This section estimates that Chile’s success in curving the MIT cannot be attributed to 
industrial policies aimed to technologically upgrade its industries. The inability to create a 
more diversified high value-added export basket is the result of several structural 
weaknesses that emerged as consequence of the neoliberal policies. , which have generally 
limited opportunities to diversify exports as it has instead, promoted the exploitation of 
these areas where the country already had a comparative advantage (Caldentey, 2012, p. 
186).  
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3.3. C) Chile’s Comparative Advantages and Export Composition   
Like the previous, this category remarks the importance of an export-driven strategy to 
overcome the trap. However, scholars from this body are pessimistic about expecting MI 
countries to produce high valued-added goods since they lack the necessary means (Lin, 
2017, p. 6). The solution lies in an export-led growth strategy pushed by an active state to 
sponsor comparative advantage targeted industrial policies. An active state encouraging 
capital and technological spillovers from industry to industry is considered to be the fastest 
way to build a sophisticated export basket.   
To attribute Chile’s success to this category the following conditions have to be 
present: 1) consistent exploitation of its comparative advantages, 2) significant capital and 
technological spillovers for the promotion of new industries, and as a result, 3) notable 
diversification of its export basket towards higher value-added industries.  
1) Exploitation of Comparative Advantages 
Chile’s best comparative advantages are present in the natural resource-based sector. 
Mining is the champion industry, making for 40% of the total value of Chile’s exports in 2003 
and rising to as much as 57% by 2013. In real terms, the value of mining exports have been 
multiplied by five from US $8 Billion to US $20 Billion during the same time span (Banco 
Central de Chile, 2019).  
Copper accounts for 90% of the total value and there is no doubt Chile has exploited 
this industry to a very large extent. So much that even between 2000 and 2014, the total 
factor productivity in copper mining actually decreased a 14%, while copper production rose 
a 19% between 2000 and 2017 (CNP, 2017, p. 75). That is mainly, because during the 
commodity-boom and the consequent high copper prices, mining firms prioritized increases 
in production at the cost of productivity (CNP, 2017, p. 83).   
During the first half of the commodity-boom, from 2000 to 2008, copper prices 
multiplied by five. This increase was indeed, extremely beneficial for the Chilean economy, 
given that at the time, the country was supplying more than a third of the world’s total 
copper. If in 1996 copper made about a 7% of Chile’s tax revenue, thanks to the commodity 
super-cycle during 2006 and 2007 the share increased up to 30% (CNP, 2017, p. 49). 
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‘Codelco’, Chile’s state-owned mining firm, contributed with 5.8% of the total tax revenue 
collected by the government between 1995 and 2003; between 2006 and 2010, however, 
this share rose to 26.7% (Korinek, 2013, p. 16). Now that is clear that Chile has largely 
succeeded to exploit its comparative advantage in mining, the rest of the section focuses on 
spillovers and the diversification achieved.  
2) Spillovers 
There has been a notable degree of export diversification but mostly within the natural 
resources sector. Behind the mining industry, other natural-related industries such as 
forestry, agriculture and fishery, comprised the second largest industry. Chile is among the 
largest exporters of wine, salmon and wood pulp; these industries could have only emerged 
thanks to a mixture of technological and knowledge transfers and FDI spillovers as they have 
common denominators to other resource-based industries (Caldentey, 2012, pp. 189-193). 
Nevertheless, the subsequent effects of this accomplishment have been very limited.  
Agosin, et al. find only 155 success export-discoveries between 1991 and 2003 (new 
products that by 2007 exceeded the value of US $20 million) (Agosin, 2009, p. 18). The 
resource-based sector made up for most of them; especially, wood and wood products like 
pulp and paper; fish products like salmon and trout (Agosin, 2009, p. 17). Within the natural 
resource-based sector, agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing comprised the second 
biggest industry area where Chile enjoys a comparative advantage. In real  terms it increased 
from US $2 billion to US $5.6 billion from 2003 to 2013, but in relative terms to the total 
value of exports, it decreased from 10% to 7% during the same years; while, as it previously 
stated, mining continue growing at the expense of other industries (Banco Central de Chile, 
2019). Hence, most of the progress made in these industries took place during the 1990s, 
ever since, the total share has decreased while mining continued to grow.  
The product concentration index, also known as Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(Product HHI) measures how diversified a country’s exports are; a number close to 0 shows 
these are largely and homogenously distributed among a limited series of products, whereas, 
a number close to 1 indicates these are very concentrated on a few products. In 1995, Chile’s 
product concentration index was 0.305 and increased to 0.329 by 2013 – significantly higher 
than UMI other economies in the region like Brazil (0.151), Argentina (0.172) and most HI 
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OECD countries (WITS, 2019). In brief, Chile’s product basket has been and remains not 
extensively diversified across a wide variety of areas.  
Chile has not been successful either in producing vertical spillovers within the mining 
industry since it continues to struggle to move production beyond the chain of copper 
extraction and refinery to the production of copper manufacturing goods (Korinek, 2013, pp. 
36-38). This reality, according to this body of research, makes unlikely that exports were 
diversified and upgraded to more technologically advanced industries.  
3) Export diversification 
Finally, Chile’s overfocus on its comparative advantage can be reflected on its export 
diversification index score, that is the extent to which the exports of a country differ from 
the world’s average. In most developed countries the number is close to 0 (as these usually 
have a wide variety of exports), while in the less sophisticated economies the number is 
closer to 1, indicating their export basket is quite unique. Chile scored 0.778 in 1995 and 
0.729 in 2013, substantially higher compared with UMI economies in 2013 such as Mexico 
(0.406) and Malaysia (0.443) (UNCTADSTAT, 2019). Chile has not converged to the average 
HI export structure, it continues to be of a unique nature concentrated on a fewer series of 
products relative to HI countries.    
There is no doubt that Chile fulfils the first requirement in this body of literature – 
exploiting its comparative advantage. However, Chile’s export basket reflect that spillovers 
have been too scarce and that mining, far from leaving space for other industries to emerge, 
has taken a larger share in the total value of exports. Only in agriculture, forestry and fishing, 
Chile has developed a remarkable comparative advantage, yet in the decade previous to 
2013 its total share has actually decreased compared to mining. In regard to industrial 
upgrading and export diversification there is a clear failure of the CNIC that can be attributed 
to a lack of consensus, vision, strategy, clear goals, something that good institutions alone 
cannot make up for (Foxley & Stalling, 2016, pp. 30-31). 
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Conclusion 
The fact that, scholars, journalists and even Chilean top officials themselves, understand and 
share the same idea about the inherent difficulties to reach the HI level (The Economist, 
2018), makes the MIT real as any other concept in international political economy. For that 
reason, studying a universal concept at a national level, can help to discern what these 
shared difficulties are, as their causes and policy prescriptions might be applicable in other 
contexts. In the case of Chile, getting institutions and education right in combination with 
market-friendly policies helped the country escape the trap, but at is discussed at the end of 
the conclusion, this success came at the expense of other failures. 
Summary 
This paper studied Chile’s trajectory from UMI to HI country based on the concept of the MIT 
and the main literature about it, with the research question ‘How did Chile overcome the 
middle-income trap?’. Chapter 1 evaluated the arguments for and against the existence of 
the MIT and concludes: the arguments against suffer from serious flaws in understanding the 
concept as they oversimplify its meaning and scope of interest by homogenizing the in-
country experiences across time and space. On the contrary, arguments for the existence of 
a trap are methodologically more sound and helpful to better understand the shared 
inherent challenges MI countries face to reach the HI level.  
Chapter 1 proceeds to draw from Kanchoochat’s work (2015) on the three main 
bodies of literature about the causes and policy prescriptions for the trap, in order to 
subsequently apply these to the case of Chile and to assess in which one its experience fits 
best. The first body, based on neoclassical economics, considers that the government should 
be limited and mostly concerned with getting institutions and education right, and 
meanwhile, free markets are expected to do their magic and produce wealth. The second 
body prescribes an export-led growth strategy by an active state in industrial policy in order 
to promote industrial upgrading for the economy to better compete with HI countries in the 
production of high value-added products. The third body also understands the importance of 
an active state and an export-led growth strategy, but advocates that instead of attempting 
to produce high-quality products, a country should first exploit its comparative advantages, 
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produce all kinds of spillovers (e.g. technological, information, capital…) and gradually 
transform its export basket into a more sophisticated and diversified one. 
Chapter 2 introduces the unusual case of Chile, neither similar to the East Asian 
Tigers nor to other Latin American countries. A historical background is provided to place 
into context some of the key economic and trade policies from the 1973 coup d’état until 
Chile’s graduation to the HI level during Piñera’s first term in office. During these decades, 
Chile experienced outstanding rates of economic growth, especially during the concertación 
era (1990-2010). Institutions were quick and efficient to adjust their policies to deal with for 
instance: the 2008 global financial crisis and the devastating 2010 earthquake, using 
resources from the ESSF. Throughout the historical analysis , it is also highlighted the strong 
influence of copper prices fluctuations on the economy. As follows, some methodological 
remarks are presented. The chosen process-tracing method, namely ‘explaining-outcome 
process tracing’, is selected as it helps to give an account of historical events by testing 
theories that “can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome.”(Beach & 
Pedersen, 2013, p. 63). The chapter ends by discussing the methodological imitations of the 
study.  
Chapter 3 looked at the MIT phenomenon in Chile from a sectorial approach based 
on the three bodies of literature distinguished by Kanchoochat (2015). From the analysis , it is 
discerned that Chile’s escaping experience fits at best in the first body of literature: getting 
institutions and education right. Not only does Chile’s trajectory fulfil the requirements to 
categorize it in the first body of literature, it can also be confidently discarded from the 
second and third bodies. An analysis of its export basket, innovation efforts and 
accomplishments, as well as achieved spillovers, strongly supports the idea that unlike the 
East Asian Tigers, Chile’s success was certainly not based on a developmentlist-focused 
strategy with a dynamic industrial policy. Instead, Chile’s progress can be surely attributed to 
efficient and market-friendly institutions that created the suitable environment for the 
exploitation of the country’s comparative advantages, for instance: maintaining 
macroeconomic stability, trade openness and guaranteeing the preservation of free markets 
– some of the essential tactics for pursuing a strategy as such. In addition, improvements in 
the higher education system have created a better workforce of highly skilled professionals 
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capable of efficiently steering these institutions and optimizing the exploitation of the 
country’s comparative advantages.  
Discussion of Results 
Chile’s rise to the HI level had very positive impacts for the economy as a whole. According 
to the liberal understanding, in theory, good economic performance will eventually trickle 
down the profits and to a large extent, in practice, that was true in Chile. The alarming 
poverty Former President Alwyn warned about was as high as 45.1% of the total population 
in 1987; since then it decreased to 20.2% by 2000 and to 7.8% by 2013. Extreme poverty was 
even more reduced from 17.4% in 1987 to 5.6% in 2000 and to as little as 2.5% by 2013 
(SEDLAC, 2019). Furthermore, surpluses have also allowed the government to improve the 
welfare state. For instance, in 2002, Chile first began to offer unemployment benefits and by 
2008, 19.5% of all the unemployed could enjoy it (a share considerably higher than 
neighboring Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) (Foxley, 2012, p. 102). Government spending has 
remained circa 10% as of GDP during the concertación era, but given that the economy grew 
at great pace during this time, so did the total social spending in per capita terms (Ffrench-
Davis, 2002, p. 189; Jeong, 2013, p. 222).  
Chile’s inclusive, open and efficient institutions have stand out for their performance 
in maintaining high rates of growth with market-friendly policies. In 2012, the World Bank 
institutional indicators ranked Chile at the same level of Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, 
and in some specific indicators it scored even higher (Foxley & Stalling, 2016, p. 17; WGI, 
2013). The openness of Chilean institutions to trade is reflected in the vast amounts of FDI it 
draws: 11.4% of its GDP in 2012, notably higher compared to the 2% European Union 
average, the 1.5% OECD average and less than 1% in South Korea (OECD, 2019b). 
The government of Chile has made meaningful progress on improving the education 
system (especially at the tertiary level), which has been very positive for the economy and 
growth (OECD, 2017, pp. 20-29). To a large extent, education has also been a great 
contributor for both: the right guidance of Chilean institutions and the exploitation of the 
country’s comparative advantages. Although in education rankings (e.g. skills, attainment or 
access), Chile scores quite below the East Asian Tigers, given the exceptional performance of 
the latter (often in the top 10 of the rankings) and the differences in income per capita; 
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Chile’s performance in education is not significantly bad relative to the Asian countries 
(OECD, 2010, 2013). In fact, Chile’s evaluation by the Human Capital Index (HCI) indicator 
suggests that this one is higher than what would be predicted from its income level, that is, 
relative to other countries: there is a better human capital with less national wealth (World 
Bank, 2018c).  
Considering that Chile is a recent graduate of the MIT and the East Asian Tigers 
escaped the trap decades ago, it would be unfair to compare the two at this point in time. 
Furthermore, since, what matters according to the first body of literature in what respects to 
education is mainly: targeted improvements to produce economic growth, then the efforts 
of Chile according to its growth strategy cannot be practically compared to the them. 
However, there are three factors to be pessimistic about Chile’s success escaping the MIT: 1) 
the reductionist understanding of GNI as an indicator of development, 2) the prevailing high 
rates of inequality, and 3) the overdependence on copper exports.  
Three Factors to Be Pessimistic About Chile’s Graduation  
Among the literature that acknowledge the existence of the trap, not every scholar agrees 
that it is enough to surpass a certain income threshold. Ohno takes a qualitative approach to 
identify the MIT, locating it as a ‘glass ceiling’ between the stairs of industrial and 
technological catch-up – when countries can produce high-quality goods without foreign 
guidance (2009, pp. 7-8). This alternative understanding of the MIT suggests that in a more 
practical and emancipatory sense, Chile did not quite escaped the it in 2013. To conclude the 
paper three factors are presented to be pessimistic about Chile’s graduation.  
First: GNI does not necessarily reflects the development of an economy. According to 
World Bank standard measurements (Gross National Income per capita Atlas method), in 
2013, Chile unequivocally escaped the MIT as a whole national economy as it was labelled a 
HI country. And, as it is argued by this paper: thanks to efficient and market-friendly 
institutions and targeted improvements in the tertiary education system. Despite that GNI 
can be considered a comprehensive metric to reflect the overall condition of an economy, 
this indicator is a non-discriminatory average number that overlooks problems such as 
inequality, which is extremely high in Chile compared to the OECD standard.  
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Second: the high rates of inequality could disqualify Chile from the HI level. The social 
protection system is still too divided for HI standards; with wealthy individuals receiving high 
quality and expensive private services while the less fortunate people only access to low 
quality public ones (Foxley, 2012, p. 92). Although private access to health, education and 
housing has improved, their costs relative to income has increased significantly (p. 144). The 
discontent of the population has grown consequently, most recently culminating in the civil 
protests that began in October 2019.   
Third: Chile’s overreliance on the copper industry makes the economy very fragile. By 
exploiting its main comparative advantage, Chile has generated large surpluses that have 
helped the economy attain high rates of economic growth. However, this strategy has forced 
the economy to overly rely on copper, making growth dependent on demand, price and 
other fluctuations in the market. The Chilean economy might be today ill adapted for the 
future as its copper industry is fragile to external demand and other shocks that can threaten 
sustainable growth. Whereas, the East Asian Tigers, thanks that they became HI economies 
by climbing the technological stairs of the ladder, they are nowadays pioneers in inventing 
and producing cutting-edge high value-added products, and as a result, their export 
economies are much more resilient than the Chilean.  
The ambiguity of understanding the MIT in reference to the vague yardstick of GNI in 
combination with the high economic disparities in Chile and the overreliance on the copper 
industry, makes the author conclude this study with a pessimistic outlook about Chile’s 
graduation to the World Bank’s HI level.   
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